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Abstract. When formally analyzing security protocols it is often im-
portant to express properties in terms of an adversary’s inability to dis-
tinguish two protocols. It has been shown that this problem amounts to
deciding the equivalence of two constraint systems, i.e., whether they
have the same set of solutions. In this paper we study this equivalence
problem when cryptographic primitives are modeled using a group equa-
tional theory, a special case of monoidal equational theories. The results
strongly rely on the isomorphism between group theories and rings. This
allows us to reduce the problem under study to the problem of solving
systems of equations over rings. We provide several new decidability and
complexity results, notably for equational theories which have applica-
tions in security protocols, such as exclusive or and Abelian groups which
may additionally admit a unary, homomorphic symbol.
1 Introduction
Automated verification methods used for the analysis of security protocols have
been shown extremely successful in the last years. They have for instance been
able to discover flaws in the Single Sign On Protocols used in Google Apps [5].
In 2001, J. Millen and V. Shmatikov [19] have shown that confidentiality prop-
erties can be encoded as satisfiability of a constraint system. This approach has
been widely studied and extended both in terms of the supported cryptographic
primitives and security properties (e.g. [11, 7]).
Recently, many works have concentrated on indistinguishability properties,
which state that two slightly different protocols look the same to an adversary
who interacts with either one of the protocols. The notion of indistinguishability
can be modelled using equivalences from cryptographic calculi (e.g. [3, 2]) and
are useful to model a variety of properties such as resistance to guessing attacks
in password based protocols [7] as well as anonymity like properties in various
applications [16, 4]. More generally, indistinguishability allows one to model se-
curity by the means of ideal systems, which are correct by construction [3]. In
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2005, M. Baudet has shown that the equivalence of traces can again be encoded
using constraint systems: instead of deciding whether a constraint system is sat-
isfiable one needs to decide whether two constraint systems have the same set of
solutions. M. Baudet [7], and later Y. Chevalier and M. Rusinowitch [10], have
proven the equivalence of two constraint systems decidable when cryptographic
primitives are modelled by a subterm convergent equational theory. Subsequently
more practical procedures have been implemented in prototype tools [8, 22].
Our contributions. We continue the study of the problem of deciding the equiv-
alence of constraint systems used to model security protocols. In particular we
consider the case where cryptographic primitives are modelled using a group
theory. Group theories are a special case of monoidal theories which have been
extensively studied by F. Baader and W. Nutt [20, 6] who have provided a com-
plete survey of unification in these theories. Group theories include theories for
exclusive or and Abelian groups. These theories are useful to model many secu-
rity protocols (see [13]), as well as for modeling low level properties of encryption
schemes and chaining modes.
More precisely we provide several new decidability and complexity results
for the equivalence of constraint systems. We consider exclusive or and Abelian
Groups which may also contain a unary homomorphic symbol. Our results rely
on an encoding of the problem in systems of equations on a ring associated to
the equational theory under study.
We may note that these equational theories have been previously studied for
deciding the satisfiability of constraint systems [17] and for the static equivalence
problem [12]. To the best of our knowledge these are however the first results to
decide equivalence of constraint systems for these theories, which in contrast to
static equivalence considers the presence of a fully active adversary. We also note
that studying group theories may seem very restricted since they do not con-
tain the equational theories for classical operators like encryption or signatures.
However, combination results for disjoint equational theories for the problems
of satisfiability of constraint systems [9] and static equivalence [12] have already
been developed and we are confident that similar results can be obtained for
equivalence properties.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we recall some basic notation and the central
notion of group theory. Then, in Section 3, we introduce the notion of constraint
systems and define the two problems we are interested in. The sections 4, 5,
and 6 are devoted to the study of the satisfiability and equivalence problems.
Our results are summarized in Section 6. Detailed proofs of our results can be
found in [15].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Terms
A signature Σ consists of a finite set of function symbols, each with an arity.
A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant symbol. We assume that N is an
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infinite set of names and X an infinite set of variables. The concept of names
is borrowed from the applied pi calculus [2] and is used to model fresh, secret
values. Let A be a set of atoms which may consist of names and variables. We
denote by T (Σ,A) the set of terms over Σ ∪ A. We write n(t) (resp. v(t)) for
the set of names (resp. variables) that occur in the term t. A term is ground if it
does not contain any variable. A substitution σ is a mapping from a finite subset
of X called its domain and written dom(σ) to T (Σ,N ∪ X ). Substitutions are
extended to endomorphisms of T (Σ,X ) as usual. We use a postfix notation for
their application.
2.2 Group theories
Equational theories are very useful for modeling the algebraic properties of the
cryptographic primitives. Given a signature Σ, an equational theory E is a set of
equations (i.e., a set of unordered pairs of terms in T (Σ,X )). Given two terms u
and v such that u, v ∈ T (Σ,N ∪ X ), we write u =E v if the equation u = v is
a consequence of E. In this paper, we are particularly interested in the class of
group theories, a special case of monoidal theories introduced by F. Baader [6]
and W. Nutt [20]. It captures many theories with AC properties, which are known
to be difficult to deal with.
Definition 1 (group theory). A theory E over Σ is called a group theory if
it satisfies the following properties:
1. The signature Σ contains a binary function symbol +, a unary symbol − and
a constant symbol 0. All other function symbols in Σ are unary.
2. The symbol + is associative-commutative with unit 0 and inverse −. This
means that the equations x+ (y+ z) = (x+ y) + z, x+ y = y+ x, x+ 0 = x
and x+ (−x) = 0 are in E.
3. Every unary function symbol h ∈ Σ is an endomorphism for + and 0, i.e.
h(x+ y) = h(x) + h(y) and h(0) = 0.
Note that a group theory on a given signature Σ may contain arbitrary
additional equalities over Σ. The only requirement is, that at least the laws
given above hold. By abuse of notation we sometimes write t1− t2 for t1 +(−t2).
Example 1. Suppose + is a binary function symbol and 0 a constant. Moreover
assume that the others symbols, i.e −, h, are unary symbols. The equational
theories below are group theories.
– The theory ACUN (exclusive or) over Σ = {+, 0} which consist of the axioms
for associativity (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z) and commutativity x+ y = y + x
(AC), unit x+ 0 = x (U) and Nilpotency x+ x = 0 (N).4
– The theory AG (Abelian groups) over Σ = {+,−, 0} which is generated
by the axioms (AC), (U) and x + −(x) = 0 (Inv). Note that the equations
−(x+ y) = −(x) +−(y) and −0 = 0 are consequences of the others.
4 We here omit to explicit the inverse symbol − as it acts as the identity, i.e. −x = x.
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– The theories ACUNh over Σ = {+, h, 0} and AGh over Σ = {+,−, h, 0}:
these theories correspond to the ones described above extended by the ho-
momorphism laws (h) for the symbol h, i.e., h(x + y) = h(x) + h(y) and
h(0) = 0.
Other examples of monoidal and group theories can be found in [20].
2.3 Group theories define rings
Group theories have an algebraic structure which are rings.
Definition 2 (ring). A ring is a set R (called the universe of the ring) with
distinct elements 0 and 1 that is equipped with two binary operations + and ·
such that (R,+, 0) is an Abelian group, (R, ·, 1) is a monoid, and the following
identities hold for all α, β, γ ∈ R:
– (α+ β) · γ = α · γ + β · γ (right distributivity)
– α · (β + γ) = α · β + α · γ (left distributivity)
We call the binary operations + and · respectively the addition and the
multiplication of the ring. The elements 0 and 1 are called respectively zero
and unit. The (additive) inverse of an element a ∈ R is denoted −a. A ring is
commutative if its multiplication is commutative.
It has been shown in [20] that for any group theory E there exists a corre-
sponding ring RE. We can rephrase the definition of RE as follows. Let a be a
name (a ∈ N ), the universe of RE is T (Σ, {a})/E, that is the set of equivalence
classes of terms built over Σ and a under equivalence by the equational axioms E.
The constant 0, the sum + and the additive inverse − of the ring are defined as
in the algebra T (Σ, {a})/E.
Given an element of the ring RE, and a term v, multiplication in the ring
is defined by u · v := u[a 7→ v] where u[a 7→ v] denotes the term u where
any occurrence of a has been replaced by v. It can be shown [20] that RE is
commutative if, and only if, E has commuting homomorphisms, i.e., h1(h2(x)) =E
h2(h1(x)) for any two homomorphisms h1 and h2. For instance, we have that:
– The ring RACUN consists of the two elements 0 and 1 and we have 0 + 1 =
1 + 0 = 1, 0 + 0 = 1 + 1 = 0, 0 · 0 = 1 · 0 = 0 · 1 = 0, and 1 · 1 = 1. Hence,
RACUN is isomorphic to the commutative ring (field) Z/2Z.
– The ring RAGh is isomorphic to Z[h] which is a commutative ring. Note that
there are two homomorphisms in the theory AGh, namely − and h and these
two homomorphisms commute: h(−x) = −(h(x)).
By abuse of notation, we often omit the · and we mix up the elements of
isomorphomic rings. Thus, we will write 2v instead of (a+ a) · v, and (h + h2)v
instead of (h(a) + h2(a)) · v.
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3 Constraint systems
As mentioned in the introduction, constraint systems are quite common (see
e.g. [19, 11, 7]) to model the possible executions of a protocol once an interleaving
has been fixed. We recall here their formalism.
3.1 Definitions
Following the notations of [7], we consider a new set W of variables, called
parameters w1, w2, . . . and a new set X 2 of variables called second-order variables
X,Y, . . ., each variable with an arity, denoted ar(X). We call T (Σ,W ∪X 2) the
set of second-order terms and T (Σ,N ∪X ) the set of first-order terms, or simply
terms. Given a term t we denote by var1(t) (resp. var2(t)) the first-order (resp.
second-order) variables of t, i.e. var1(t) = v(t) ∩ X (resp. var2(t) = v(t) ∩ X 2).
We lift these notations to sets and sequences of terms as expected.
Definition 3. A constraint system is a triple (Φ;D; E) where:
– Φ is a sequence of the form {w1 B t1, . . . , w` B t`} where ti are terms and
wi are parameters;
– D is a set of deducibility constraints of the form X B? x with ar(X) < `;
– E is a set of equalities of the form s =?E s′ where s, s′ are first-order terms.
In the following we will, by abuse of notation, confuse sequences {w1 B
t1, . . . , w` B t`} with corresponding substitutions {w1 → t1, . . . , w` → t`}. We
will not formally introduce a language for describing protocols and we only
informally describe how a constraint system is associated to an interleaving of
a protocol. We refer to [19] for a more detailed description. We simply suppose
that protocols may perform three kinds of action:
– A protocol may output terms. These terms correspond to the ti in Φ and rep-
resent the adversary’s knowledge after having executed part of the protocol.
We call the sequence of terms Φ the frame.
– A protocol may input terms which can be computed by the adversary. Each
input corresponds to a deducibility constraint X B? x ∈ D. The second-
order variable X of arity k has to be instantiated by a context over the
terms t1, . . . , tk. This models the computation, used by the adversary to
deduce the first-order term that will instantiate x.
– A protocol may perform tests on inputs to check that the terms match some
expected values. These tests are modelled by the equality constraints in E
and may as such contain the variables x which correspond to previously
received inputs.
Example 2. Consider the group theory AG and an interleaving of a protocol
described by the following sequence:
out(a).out(b).in(x1).out(c+ 2x1).in(x2).[x1 + x2 = c]
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where a, b, and c are names in N , out(t) models the output of term t, in(x) the
input of a term that will be bound to x and [t1 = t2] models the conditional which
tests that t1 and t2 are equal modulo AG, after having instantiated previous input
variables. This protocol yields the constraint system C = (Φ;D; E) where:
– Φ = {w1 B a,w2 B b, w3 B c+ 2x1},
– D = {X1 B? x1, X2 B? x2} with ar(X1) = 2 and ar(X2) = 3, and
– E = {x1 + x2 =?E c}.
Indeed the three elements of the sequence Φ correspond to the three outputs
of the protocol. The two deduction constraints in D model that the adversary
needs to provide the inputs. Note that the first input occurs after two outputs.
Hence the adversary may refer to w1 and w2, but not w3. This is modelled by
setting ar(X1) = 2. As the second input occurs after three outputs we have that
ar(X2) = 3. Finally, E simply consists in the test performed by the protocol.
The size of a frame Φ = {w1 B t1, . . . , w` B t`}, denoted |Φ|, is its length `.
We also assume the following conditions are satisfied on a constraint system:
1. for every x ∈ var1(C), there exists a unique X such that (X B? x) ∈ D, and
each variable X occurs at most once in D;
2. for every 1 ≤ k ≤ `, for every x ∈ var1(tk), there exists (X B? x) ∈ D such
that ar(X) < k.
These constraints are natural whenever the constraint system models an inter-
leaving of a protocol. Condition 1 simply states that each variable defines a
unique input. Condition 2 ensures a form of causality: whenever a term tk is
output it may only use variables that have been input before; the condition
ar(X) < k ensures that the adversary when computing the input to be used
for x only refers to terms in the frame that have been output before. This sec-
ond condition is often called origination property.
Given a frame Φ = {w1 B t1, . . . , wn B tn}, and a second-order term T
with parameters in {w1, . . . , wn} and without second-order variable TΦ denotes
the first-order term obtained from T by replacing each wi by ti. We define the
structure of a constraint system C = (Φ;D; E) to be |Φ| and var2(D) with their
arity.
Example 3. Note that the two additional conditions are fulfilled by the constraint
system C given in Example 2. In particular, we have that the variable x1 that
occurs in t3 has been introduced by the deducibility constraint X1 B? x1 and
ar(X1) = 2 < 3. Let C′ = (Φ′;D; E ′) where Φ′ = {w1 B a′, w2 B b′, w3 B c′+x1},
and E ′ = {x2 + 2x1 =?E c′}. We have that C′ is a constraint system that has the
same structure as C. Note that |Φ| = 3 = |Φ′| and var2(D) = {X1, X2}.
3.2 Satisfiability and equivalence problems
First, we have to define the notion of solution of a constraint system.
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Definition 4. A pre-solution of a constraint system C = (Φ;D; E) is a substi-
tution θ such that:
– dom(θ) = var2(C), and
– Xθ ∈ T (Σ, {w1, . . . , wk}) for any X ∈ dom(θ) with ar(X) = k.
The substitution λ with dom(λ) = var1(C) and such that xλ = (Xθ)(Φλ) for any
X B? x in D is called the first-order extension of θ for C.
Intuitively, in the preceding definition the substitution θ stores the compu-
tation done by the adversary in order to compute the messages he sends (stored
in λ) during the execution. Note that, because of the definition of a constraint
system, once θ is fixed, its first-order extension is uniquely defined.
To obtain a solution we need to additionally ensure that the first-order ex-
tension λ of a pre-solution θ verifies the equality constraints in E .
Definition 5. Let C = (Φ;D; E) be a constraint system. A solution of C is a
pre-solution θ of C whose first-order extension λ satisfies the equalities, i.e. for
every (s =?E s
′) ∈ E, we have that sλ =E s′λ. In such a case, the substitution λ
is called the first-order solution of C associated to θ. The set of solutions of a
constraint system C is denoted SolE(C).
We now define the two problems we are interested in.
Definition 6. A constraint system C = (Φ;D; E) is satisfiable if SolE(C) 6= ∅.
In the context of security protocols satisfiability of a constraint system corre-
sponds to the adversary’s ability to execute an interleaving of the protocol. This
generally corresponds to an attack. For instance confidentiality of some secret
term s can be encoded by adding an additional deducibility constraint Xs B? xs
together with an equality constraint xs =
?
E s (or equivalently adding a final input
in(xs) to the protocol and testing that the adversary is able to send the term s
by adding [xs = s]).
Definition 7. Let C1 = (Φ1;D1; E1) and C2 = (Φ2;D2; E2) be two constraint
systems having the same structure. We say that C1 is included in C2, denoted by
C1 v C2, if SolE(C1) ⊆ SolE(C2). They are equivalent if C1 v C2 and C2 v C1, i.e.
SolE(C1) = SolE(C2).
Again, in the context of security protocols this problem corresponds to the ad-
versary’s inability to distinguish whether the protocol participants are executing
the interleaving modelled by C1 or C2. For the exact encoding we refer the reader
to [7].
Example 4. Consider the constraint systems C and C′ described in Example 2
and Example 3. The substitution θ = {X1 7→ w1 +w2, X2 7→ −3w1 − 3w2 +w3}
is a pre-solution of both C and C′. The first-order extension of θ for C is the
substitution λ = {x1 7→ a+ b, x2 7→ −a− b+ c} whereas the first-order extension
of θ for C′ is the substitution λ′ = {x1 7→ a′ + b′, x2 7→ −2a′ − 2b′ + c′}. It
is easy to check that θ is actually a solution of both C and C′, and thus both
constraint systems are satisfiable. Actually, we have that C and C′ are equivalent,
i.e. SolAG(C) = SolAG(C′).
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In what follows, we consider decidability and complexity issues for the satis-
fiability and equivalence problems for group theories. In particular, we proceed
in three main steps:
1. we reduce both problems to the case of simple constraint systems (where the
terms ti that occurs in the frame Φ are ground terms);
2. we show how to encode solutions of a (simple) constraint system in a system
of (linear) equations;
3. we conclude by showing how to solve such a system of equations.
4 Towards simple constraint systems
The aim of this section is to show how we can transform constraint systems
in order to obtain simple constraint systems while preserving satisfiability and
inclusion. This transformation has been first introduced in [9] to simplify the
satisfiability problem for the exclusive or and Abelian group theories. We reuse
it in a more general setting. From now on, we consider a group equational theory
(see Definition 1).
Let C = (Φ;D; E) where Φ = {w1 B t1, . . . , w` B t`}. Let τ = {w1 →
w1 −M1, · · · , w` → w` −M`} be a substitution with dom(τ) = {w1, · · · , w`}.
We say that the substitution τ is compatible with C iff M1, · · · ,M` are second-
order terms that do not contain parameters and such that var2(Mi) ⊆ {X ∈
var2(C) | ar(X) < i}. We define the constraint system Cτ as (Φτ ;D; E) where:
– Φτ = {w1 B t′1, . . . , w` B t′`}, and
– t′i = ti +Mi{X → x | X B? x ∈ D} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
Notice that, if τ is compatible with C, the origination property is satisfied for Cτ ,
thus Cτ is a constraint system. Let θ be a pre-solution of C (or equivalently of Cτ ).
We denote by θτ the substitution (θ ◦ τ)m where m = #var2(C).
Example 5. Consider again the constraint systems C and C′ described in Ex-
ample 2 and Example 3. Let τ = {w1 → w1, w2 → w2, w3 → w3 − (−2X1)}.
We have that τ is a substitution compatible with C and C′. Then, following the
definition, we have that Cτ is (Φτ ;D; E) where Φτ = {w1 B a,w2 B b, w3 B c}
whereas C′τ is (Φ′τ ;D; E ′) where Φ′τ = {w1 B a′, w2 B b′, w3 B c′ − x1}
Consider the substitution θ = {X1 → w1 + w2, X2 → −3w1 − 3w2 + w3} as
defined in Example 4. We have that (θ ◦ τ) = {X1 → w1 + w2, X2 → −3w1 −
3w2 +w3 + 2X1}, thus θτ = (θ ◦ τ)2 = {X1 → w1 +w2, X2 → −w1 −w2 +w3}.
It follows that λ = {x1 → a+ b, x2 → −a− b+ c} (as defined in Example 4)
is also the first-order extension of θτ for Cτ , and thus θτ ∈ SolAG(Cτ ). Similarly,
we have that λ′ = {x1 → a′+ b′, x2 → −2a′−2b′+ c′} (as defined in Example 4)
is also the first-order extension of θτ for C′τ , and thus θτ ∈ SolAG(C′τ ).
The fact that the messages computed by the attacker in both cases are the
same can be formally shown. This is the purpose of the following lemma that
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shows that the first-order extensions of θ for C and of θτ for Cτ coincide. Actually,
the changes made in the frame (Φ is transformed into Φτ ) are compensated by
the computations that are performed by the attacker (θ is transformed into θτ ).
This will be used later on for simplifying the two problems we are interested in.
Lemma 1. Let C = (Φ;D; E) be a constraint system defined as above and τ =
{w1 → w1 −M1, · · · , w` → w` −M`} be a substitution compatible with C. Let θ
be a pre-solution of C. Then, the first-order extension of θ for C is equal to the
first-order extension of θτ for Cτ .
Thanks to this lemma, we are able to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let C = (Φ;D; E) and C′ = (Φ′;D′; E ′) be two constraint sys-
tems having the same structure and such that |Φ| = |Φ′| = `. Let τ = {w1 →
w1 −M1, . . . , w` → w` −M`} be a substitution compatible with C (and C′). We
have that:
1. C satisfiable if, and only if, Cτ satisfiable;
2. C v C′ if, and only if, Cτ v C′τ .
Let C = (Φ;D; E) with Φ = {w1 B t1, . . . , w` B t`}. We say that the constraint
system C is simple if the terms t1, . . . , t` are ground. We observe that for any
constraint system there exists a substitution yielding a simple constraint system.
Indeed, for any frame Φ = {w1 B t1, . . . , w` B t`} we have that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `
there exist tni and t
v
i such that ti =E t
n
i +t
v
i , v(t
n
i ) = ∅ and n(tvi ) = ∅. Now let τC =
{w1 → w1 −M1, · · · , w` → w` −M`}, where Mi = −tvi {x→ X | X B? x ∈ D}
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `. By construction the system CτC is simple.
Moreover, we say that constraint systems C and C′ are simplifiable if there
exists τ such that both Cτ and C′τ are simple. This class of constraint systems is
motivated by the fact that when checking real-or-random secrecy properties as
those studied in [7] we obtain systems that have this property. More precisely
when encoding real-or-random properties we obtain systems C = (Φ;D; E) and
C′ = (Φ′;D′; E ′) such that Φ = {w1 B t1, . . . , w` B t`}, Φ′ = {w1 B t′1, . . . , w` B
t′`} and for some 1 ≤ k ≤ ` we have that ti = t′i for i ≤ k and ti, t′i are ground
when i > k. It immediately follows that τC = τC′ and hence τC simplifies both
systems.
Using Proposition 1, we can reduce:
1. the satisfiability problem of a general constraint systems to the satisfiability
problem of a simple constraint system; and
2. the inclusion problem between solutions of general constraint systems to the
inclusion problem between solutions of a simple constraint system and a gen-
eral one, respectively to the inclusion between solutions of simple constraint
systems in the case these constraint systems are simplifiable.
Below, we illustrate how Proposition 1 can be applied.
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Example 6. Let C and C′ be the constraint systems defined in Example 2 and in
Example 3. We have that τC = τ where τ = {w1 → w1, w2 → w2, w3 → w3 −
(−2X1)} is the substitution as defined in Example 5. Relying on Proposition 1,
it follows that C v C′ if, and only if, Cτ v C′τ where Cτ and C′τ are defined in
Example 5. Thus, the equivalence problem between constraint systems C and C′
is reduced to the equivalence problem between a simple constraint system Cτ
and a general constraint system C′τ .
The purpose of the next section is to show how to decide this simplified
problem in a systematic way.
5 Encoding solutions into systems of equations
The purpose of this section is to show how to construct systems of equations
that encode solutions of constraint systems.
5.1 General constraint systems
Consider a constraint system C = (Φ;D; E) where Φ = {w1 B t1, . . . , w` B t`},
D = {X1 B? x1, . . . , Xm B? xm}, and E = {s1 =?E s′1, . . . , sn =?E s′n}.
Step 1. First, we encode second-order variables as sums of terms containing
unknown variables over RE. Actually, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, each second-order
variable Xi can be seen as a sum y
i
1t1+ · · ·+yiar(Xi)tar(Xi), where yi1, · · · , yiar(Xi)
are unknowns over RE. Therefore every constraint system C = (Φ;D; E) (as
described above) can be brought in the following form:
y11t1 + · · ·+ y1ar(X1)tar(X1) = x1 s1 = s′1
· · · · · ·
ym1 t1 + · · ·+ ymar(Xm)tar(Xm) = xm sn = s′n
where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ ar(Xi), yij are unknowns over RE, the terms
s1, s
′
1, . . . , sn, s
′
n are first-order terms that contain only variables x1, · · · , xm and
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the terms t1, . . . , tar(Xi) are first-order terms that contain only
variables x1, . . . , xi−1.
Step 2. Our next goal is to remove variables x1, · · · , xm from the first-order
terms t1, · · · , tar(Xm). For each variable xi, we inductively construct a term E(xi):
E(x1) = y
1
1t1 + · · ·+ y1ar(X1)tar(X1)
E(xi) = (y
i
1t1 + · · ·+ yiar(Xi)tar(Xi))[E(x1)/x1, · · · , E(xi−1)/xi−1] where i > 1.
Clearly, we have that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the term E(xi) is a term that does
not contain variables x1, . . . , xm.
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Step 3. Finally, we will show how a system of equations can be obtained. Given
the constraint system C, let S(C) denote its associated system of equations that
we construct. The variables of S(C) are {yij | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ ar(Xi)} and
each solution σ to S(C) encodes a second-order substitution {Xi 7→ yi1w1 + · · ·+
yiar(Xi)war(Xi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} which is a solution of C.
We take each equation si = s
′
i in E and we add a set of equations into the
system S(C). We assume that the equation si = s′i has the form a1x1 + · · · +
amxm = pi, where ai ∈ RE and pi is a ground first-order term. Notice that any
equation can be brought to this form by bringing factors that contain variables to
the left-hand side, and the other factors to the right-hand side. Next, we remove
the variables from the left-hand side by replacing them with the terms E(xi), for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus, we now have the equation a1E(x1) + · · ·+ amE(xm) = pi.
We obtain an equation for each constant, by taking the corresponding coefficients
from the left-hand side and equalizing with the coefficients from the right-hand
side. Finally, we add this equation to S(C). We give below an example to illustrate
the construction.
Example 7. Consider the constraint system C′τ defined in Example 5. We have
that C′τ = (Φ′τ ;D; E ′) where: Φ′τ = {w1 B a′, w2 B b′, w3 B c′ − x1}, and
E ′ = {x2 + 2x1 =?E c′}.
Step 1. We rewrite the constraint system C′τ as{
y11a
′ + y12b
′ = x1 x2 + 2x1 = c′
y21a
′ + y22b
′ + y23(c
′ − x1) = x2
Step 2. We construct the terms E(x1) and E(x2):
E(x1) = y
1
1a
′ + y12b
′ E(x2) = (y21a
′ + y22b
′ + y23(c
′ − x1))[E(x1)/x1]
= y21a
′ + y22b
′ + y23c
′ − y23y11a′ − y23y12b′
Step 3. We take the equation x2 + 2x1 =
?
E c and, by replacing x2 with E(x2)
and x1 with E(x1), we obtain: a(y
2
1 − y23y11 + 2y11) + b(y22 − y23y12 + 2y12) + cy23 = c.
Thus, we obtain the following system of equations S(C′τ ):
S(C′τ ) =
{
y21 − y23y11 + 2y11 = 0; y22 − y23y12 + 2y12 = 0; y23 = 1
}
Note that any integer solution over RE of the system of equations encodes
a solution of the constraint system. For instance, take y11 = 1, y
1
2 = 1, y
2
1 =
−1, y22 = −1, y23 = 1 which is a solution of S(C′τ ). This encodes the substitution
θ = {X1 → w1 + w2, X2 → −w1 − w2 + w3}, which is a solution of C′τ .
Proposition 2. Let C and C′ be two constraint systems having the same struc-
ture. Let S(C) and S(C′) be the systems of equations obtained from C and C′
using the construction described above. We have that:
1. C is satisfiable if, and only if, S(C) has a solution;
2. C v C′ if, and only if, the solutions of S(C) are also solutions of S(C′).
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5.2 Simple constraint systems
When the constraint system C is simple, then S(C) is a system of linear equations.
Lemma 2. Let C be a simple constraint system. The system S(C) is a system
of linear equations.
Indeed, in Step 2, substitutions are no longer needed since the terms t1, . . . , t`
do not contain variables, i.e. we simply define E(xi) = (y
i
1t1+· · ·+yiar(Xi)tar(Xi))
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The following example illustrates this fact.
Example 8. Consider the constraint system Cτ defined in Example 5. We have
that Cτ = (Φτ ;D; E) where Φτ = {w1 B a,w2 B b, w3 B c}, D = {X1 B?
x1, X2 B? x2}, and E = {x1 + x2 =?E c}.
Step 1. Then, we bring this constraint system into the following form:{
y11a+ y
1
2b = x1 x1 + x2 = c
y21a+ y
2
2b+ y
2
3c = x2
Step 2. It follows that: E(x1) = y
1
1a+ y
1
2b and E(x2) = y
2
1a+ y
2
2b+ y
2
3c.
Step 3. Thus, taking equation x1 + x2 = c and replacing x1 with E(x1) and x2
with E(x2) we obtain a(y
1
1 + y
2
1) + b(y
1
2 + y
2
2) + cy
2
3 = c. Therefore the obtained
system of linear equations S(Cτ ) is:
S(Cτ ) =
{
y11 + y
2
1 = 0; y
1
2 + y
2
2 = 0; y
2
3 = 1
}
6 Applications and discussion
In this section we will show how to use the previous results to decide satisfiability
and equivalence of constraint systems for several equational theories of interest.
Relying on Propositions 1 and 2, as well as Lemma 2, we have that:
Theorem 1. Let E be a group theory and RE its associated ring.
– The satisfiability problem of a constraint system is reducible in polynomial
time to the problem of deciding whether a system of linear equation admits
a solution;
– The equivalence problem between constraint systems is reducible in polyno-
mial time to the problem of deciding whether the solutions of a system of
linear equations are included in the set of solutions of a system of equation.
Moreover, if the constraint systems are simplifiable, the latter system can
also be assumed to be linear.
Actually, several interesting group theories induce a ring for which those
problems are decidable in PTIME. To prove this, we have shown that:
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Proposition 3. Let Slinear be a system of linear equations over Z/2Z (resp. Z,
Z[h], Z/2Z[h]) and S be a system of equations over Z/2Z (resp. Z, Z[h], Z/2Z[h])
such that both systems are built on the same set of variables. The problem of
deciding whether each solution of Slinear is a solution of S is decidable in PTIME.
Proof. (sketch) Roughly, in case Slinear is satisfiable (note that otherwise, the
inlusion problem is trivial), we first put it in solved form x1 = t1/d1, . . . , xn =
tn/dn where ti are terms that may contain some additional variables yj , and di
are elements in the ring under study. Then, we multiply each equation in S with
a factor that is computed from di and S and we replace in the resulting system
each xi with ti. Lastly, we check whether these equations are valid or not. If the
answer is yes, then this means that the solutions of Slinear are indeed solutions
of S. Otherwise, we can show that the inclusion does not hold. uunionsq
Example 9. Consider the system of linear equations S(Cτ ) given in Example 8
S(Cτ ) =
{
y11 + y
2
1 = 0; y
1
2 + y
2
2 = 0; y
2
3 = 1
}
This system can be rewritten into a solved form as:
S(Cτ ) =
{
y11 = −y21 ; y12 = −y22 ; y23 = 1
}
Consider also the system of equations S(C′τ ) given in Example 7:
S(C′τ ) =
{
y21 − y23y11 + 2y11 = 0; y22 − y23y12 + 2y12 = 0; y23 = 1
}
It can be seen that the solutions of S(Cτ ) are also solutions of the equations
of S(C′τ ). Indeed, all the terms reduce when replacing y11 with −y21 , y12 with −y22
and y23 with 1, as indicated in the solved form of S(Cτ ). Thus, we can finally
conclude that Cτ v C′τ , and thus C v C′ where Cτ , C′τ are defined in Example 5
and C (resp. C′) are defined in Example 2 (resp. Example 3).
Decidability and complexity results are summarized in the table. A brief
discussion on each equational theory can be found below.
Theory E RE Satisfiability Equivalence
ACUN Z/2Z PTIME [9] PTIME (new)
AG Z PTIME [9] PTIME (new)
ACUNh Z/2Z[h] PTIME PTIME (new)
AGh Z[h] PTIME PTIME (new)
Theory ACUN (exclusive or). The ring corresponding to this equational
theory is the finite field Z/2Z. The satisfiability problem for the theory ACUN
has already been studied and shown to be decidable in PTIME [9].
However, the equivalence problem has only been studied in a very particu-
lar case, the so-called static equivalence problem [1]. Static equivalence models
indistinguishability of two frames, i.e. the adversary cannot interact with the
protocol. In our setting the problem of static equivalence of frames Φ and Φ′
can be rephrased as the equivalence between two particular constraint systems
(Φ;D; {x1 =?E x2}) and (Φ′;D; {x1 =?E x2}) where:
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– Φ and Φ′ are arbitrary frames of same size that only contain ground terms;
– D = {X1 B? x1;X2 B? x2} where ar(X1) = ar(X2) = |Φ|.
The static equivalence problem has been shown to be decidable in PTIME [12].
Here, relying on our reduction result (Theorem 1), we show that we can decide
the problem of equivalence of general constraint systems in PTIME as well.
Theory AG (Abelian groups). The ring associated to this equational theory
is the ring Z of all integers. There exist several algorithms to compute solutions
of linear equations over Z and to compute a base of the set of solutions (see for
instance [21]). Hence, we easily deduce that the satisfiability problem is decidable
in PTIME. This was already observed in [9]. Deciding inclusion of solutions of a
system of linear equations in solutions of a system of non-linear equations is more
tricky but we have shown that it can be done in PTIME (see Proposition 3).
Theories ACUNh and AGh. For the theory ACUNh (resp. AGh) the associated
ring is Z/2Z[h] (resp. Z[h]), i.e. the ring of polynomials in one indeterminate
over Z/2Z (resp. Z). The satisfiability problem for these equational theories has
already been studied in [18], but in a slightly different setting. The intruder
deduction problem for these theories has been studied in [14] and shown to
be decidable in PTIME. Similar to static equivalence the intruder deduction
problem considers a passive attacker which simply asks whether a term can be
deduced by an adversary from a frame. In our setting we rephrase this problem
whether a ground term t can be deduced from Φ as the satisfiability of the
particular constraint system (Φ;D; {x =?E t}) where:
– Φ is an arbitrary frame that only contains ground terms,
– D = {X B? x} where ar(X) = |Φ|.
In [14] this problem is reduced to the problem of satisfiability of a system of
linear equations. Hence, the techniques for the problem of deciding secrecy for
a passive adversary are the same as for an active adversary and we immediately
obtain the same PTIME complexity as in [14]. However, results obtained on the
equivalence problem are new. We are able to use the same technique as for AG
to obtain decidability in PTIME. This generalizes and refines the decidability
result (without known complexity) for ACUNh and AGh in the particular case of
static equivalence [12].
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